(A) Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988), S. 7, S. 17A, S. 19 - Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 228 - Framing of charge - Challenge as to - Allegation against accused Police Constable that he demanded illegal gratification - Conduct on part of accused, cannot be treated as part of discharge of his official functions - It was not relatable to recommendation or a decision taken by accused in discharge of his official duties but was act unrelated to his official duty - Thus, act of accused did not fall within protective umbrella of S.17A of Act - S.17A of PC Act was not applicable as none of ingredients provided for in Section were satisfied to attract its operation - As far as S.19 of Act, though sanction was taken as alleged before cognizance was taken, but it would amount to mere irregularity and cannot be said to be vitiating entire criminal proceedings - Framing of charge was proper. (Para 6.2, 6.3, 8, 9, 10)
(B) Prevention of Corruption Act (49 of 1988), S. 17A - Enquiry or investigation of offences - Scope and applicability - From plain language of provision of S.17A, it is evident that provision is confined to be applied in situations where there is a recommendation or a decision taken by a public servant in discharge of his official duties.
(A) Limitation Act (36 of 1963), Art.54 - Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 34, S. 20 - Suit for possession - Limitation - Plaintiffs sought possession of a plot, claiming ownership, while defendant relied on sale deed executed in his favour by Society after original purchaser failed to raise construction within stipulated three years and requested transfer of plot in favour of defendant due to financial incapacity - Plaintiffs had not sought relief for specific performance, however, even assuming such relief had been sought, the suit would be barred under Art. 54 of Limitation Act - Limitation would have expired on 14.1.1958, reckoned from date fixed for performance - Alternatively, plaintiffs claimed to have learnt on 14.5.1963 that Society had already executed a sale deed in favour of defendant and Society confirmed this by letter, D/- 23.5.1963, so the three-year period would have expired in 1966 - Suit instituted in 1975 was barred by limitation. (Para 39(b), (c))
(B) Limitation Act (36 of 1963), Art. 59 - Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 31 - Suit for cancellation of sale deed - Limitation - Plaintiffs challenged sale deed, D/- 3.12.1960 executed by Society in favour of defendant - Art. 59 of Limitation Act prescribes three years for seeking cancellation or setting aside of instrument from date when facts entitling plaintiff to such relief first became known - Even assuming that plaintiffs acquired knowledge of sale deed only on 23.5.1963, when Society informed them of its execution in favour of defendant, limitation expired in 1966 if computed from date of execution and it expired in 1963 - Suit instituted in 1975 was barred by limitation. (Para 40)
(C) Limitation Act (36 of 1963), S. 27, Art. 64 - Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 6 - Suit for possession - Prior possession and dispossession - Limitation - Plaintiffs claimed prior possession of plot under agreement to sell, but failed to establish subsequent dispossession by Society or defendant who was put in possession in 1954 pursuant to decision of Society to transfer plot in his favour - Even assuming dispossession, suit instituted in 1975 was beyond twelve-year limitation period, which had expired by 1966 - Suit was barred by limitation. (Para 41(a), (b),(c), (d))
(D) Limitation Act (36 of 1963), S. 27, Art. 65 - Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 34 - Suit for recovery of possession - Plaintiffs sought possession of a plot, claiming ownership, while defendant relied on sale deed executed in his favour by Society after original purchaser failed to raise construction within stipulated three years and requested transfer of plot in favour of defendant due to financial incapacity - Defendant relied upon sale deed D/- 03.12.1960 in support of his claim to plot and pleaded adverse possession - Even reckoning limitation period from date of sale deed, twelve-year period expired in 1972, whereas suit was instituted in 1975 - Suit was barred by limitation and right of plaintiffs to recover possession stood extinguished under S. 27 of Limitation Act. (Para 41(e))
(E) Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882), S. 54 - Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 20 - Agreement to sell - Transfer of title - An agreement to sell does not transfer title or create any interest or charge in property proposed to be sold - Only a valid, registered sale deed is capable of conveying ownership rights in property - Mere existence of agreement to sell does not, in any manner confer title or ownership rights over property in absence of registered sale deed. (Para 44)
(F) Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882), S. 54 - Agreement to sell - Ownership rights - Plaintiffs claimed ownership through their predecessor-in-interest, who had entered into agreement to sell D/- 14.1.1952 with Society, subject to fulfilment of mandatory construction covenant - Predecessor having expressed his inability to fulfil condition by letter, D/- 4.10.1954, no registered sale deed was executed in his favour - Plaintiffs relied upon resolution of Society D/- 30.8.1959 by pleading that completion of construction recognised their ownership - A mere recital in resolution could not confer ownership in absence of registered sale deed - Neither predecessor nor plaintiffs claiming through him acquired any right, title or interest in suit plot, whereas possession of defendant since 1954 and collection of rent from 1960 to 1964 supported his claim to ownership - Plaintiffs could not claim ownership rights under agreement to sell. (Para 46, 47)
(G) Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 34 - Relief of possession - Entitlement - Plaintiffs sought possession of a plot, claiming ownership, while defendant relied on registered sale deed executed in his favour by Society after original purchaser failed to raise construction within stipulated three years and requested transfer of plot in favour of defendant due to financial incapacity - Once defendant claimed title under registered sale deed, plaintiffs ought to have sought a declaration of ownership and cancellation of sale deed or, alternatively, specific performance of agreement to sell - Mere prayer for possession could not suffice when their title was under a cloud. (Para 51, 52, 53, 68)
(H) Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S. 115 - Specific Relief Act (47 of 1963), S. 34 - Relief of possession - Entitlement - Estoppel and acquiescence - Plaintiffs claimed ownership through their predecessor-in-interest, the original allottee, who had entered into agreement to sell subject to mandatory construction covenant - Original allottee failed to fulfil said condition and later due to financial constraints and later expressed his inability to construct house and requested transfer of plot defendant pursuant to which Society permitted construction and executed a registered sale deed in his favour - Held, Conduct of original allottee constituted clear and direct acquiescence and conscious abandonment of his contractual obligation - Plaintiffs not entitled to relief of possession. (Para 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 68)
(I) Transfer of Property Act (4 of 1882), S. 53A - Agreement to sell - Part-performance - Protection under - Plaintiffs claimed protection under S. 53A by pleading that their predecessor-in-interest had performed agreement to sell - Essential requirements of S. 53-A were not satisfied, as predecessor, though initially put in possession to construct a house, subsequently requested transfer of plot to defendant who constructed house and remained in continuous possession - Further, predecessor had voluntarily abandoned agreement to sell and was neither ready nor willing to fulfil mandatory condition of construction within three years - Plaintiffs, therefore, could not claim protection under S. 53A. (Para 66, 67, 68)
(A) Registration Act (16 of 1908), S.22-A - T. N. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (22 of 1959), S.41(1), 34(1), S.34A - Alienation of trust property - In favour of State Government - Subject land was inam land vested in deity/ temple trust - Trustee executed and registered gift deed in favour of government - As per S.41(1), any exchange, gift, sale or mortgage and any lease for term exceeding five years of inam property to be null and void - Alienation of trust property by gift deed was null and void in view of S.41(1) - Further, gift deed was registered without any prior sanction or approval by competent authority in terms of S.22-A as applicable to State of Tamil Nadu - Registration of gift deed being contrary to S.22-A of Registration Act had no legal effect - State Government, which is custodian of properties belonging to religious/ charitable institutions, cannot itself become recipient of gift of such property from temporary trustee of temple. (Para .)
Capital of Punjab (Development and Regulation) Act (27 of 1952), S. 22 - Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Chandigarh Estate Rules (2007), R. 5 - E-auction - Cancellation of bid - Authority issued e-auction notice for nursing home sites - Bid of hospital was accepted - Hospital deposited 25% of bid amount, received agreement to sell and also deposited balance 75% - However, Authority subsequently cancelled accepted bid and agreement to sell on ground that bid did not reflect prevailing market trends and refunded entire amount to hospital - High Court set aside cancellation and meanwhile, pursuant to interim order passed during proceedings, a fresh auction was conducted, in which appellant emerged as highest bidder whereas hospital did not participate - In absence of allotment letter and executed conveyance deed, no enforceable right to allotment had accrued in favour of hospital - Authority was entitled to cancel bid to secure maximum public revenue, as its decision was supported by reasons and was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable - Subsequent auction fetched substantially higher price and rights arising therefrom were required to be protected - Judgment of High Court was set aside and fresh e-auction directed to be completed within three months. (Para 20, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28)
(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 482 - Quashing of complaint - Allegation levelled against accused, who was MLA, of giving false declaration as to residence in his affidavit accompanying his nomination paper, thereby committing offence punishable u/S.125A, Representation of People Act - Prima facie, allegation was more than effectively rebutted by him - Possibility of conviction was remote - Permitting proceedings to continue for trial magistrate to decide one way or other would only consume precious judicial time - Therefore, order quashing of proceedings was proper. (Para 5)
(B) Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951), S. 125A - Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S. 195 - Filing of false affidavit - Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants - S. 195(1)(i) to (iii) of Cr.P.C. impose statutory prohibition on court in relation to taking cognizance of offences punishable u/Ss. 172 to 188, IPC except on complaint in writing of public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate - Text of S. 195(1)(a) does not include S. 125A of RoP Act - Significantly, S. 125A was inserted in RoP Act with effect from 24.08. 2002, while S.195, Cr. P.C. suffered amendment thereafter in April, 2006 - Legislature is presumed to be conscious of its insertion of S. 125A in RoP Act four years back - Omission of legislature to include S. 125A of RoP Act in S. 195 of Cr. PC is deliberate and no court, in terms of latter provision, would be barred from taking cognizance of alleged offence u/S. 125A of RoP Act, even on complaint lodged by private person - Rigour of S. 195, Cr. P.C. would not be applicable insofar as complaint lodged by private person, alleging offence u/S. 125A of RoP Act, u/S. 200, Cr. PC, is concerned, whereby court is urged to penalise offender for furnishing false information in affidavit to get elected. (Para 11, 13)
(A) Constitution of India, Art. 309 - Letters Patent (Madras), Cl.15 - T. N. Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules (1955), R.15 - Letters Patent Bench - Powers of - Matter relating to removal from service - Letters Patent Bench cannot reverse well-reasoned writ court decision merely because it holds different view, especially when disciplinary removal rests on conjecture rather than concrete evidence.
(B) Letters Patent (Madras), Cl. 15 - Letters Patent Appeal - Scope - Letters Patent Appeal against judgment of Single Judge of High Court does not stand on the same footing as Second Appeal - Letters Patent Appeal lies on question of law and on questions of fact as well and it is open to the Letters Patent Bench to deal with all issues that can be examined by the writ Court and to review even findings of fact. (Para 27)
(C) Constitution of India, Art.311 - Disciplinary proceedings - Against Government servant - Role of Inquiry Officer - Explained.
(D) Constitution of India, Art.226 - Writ of certiorari - Scope - Disciplinary proceedings resulting in removal from service - Writ of certiorari can be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction, breaches of natural justice, or findings of fact based on no evidence, which amount to errors of law apparent on face of record - Finding recorded by Inquiry Officer not supported by any evidence is open to challenge in proceeding for certiorari - It is then not a matter in realm of appreciation of evidence but really of recording finding contrary to materials on record - Issue is a pure question of law and amenable to writ jurisdiction.
(E) Constitution of India, Art.226, Art.309 - T. N. Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules (1955), R.19 - Removal from service - Judicial review - Powers of writ court - Rule of exhaustion of statutory remedy is a rule of convenience and not a rule of rigid application - It is a self-imposed limitation and does not create a bar or prohibition on exercise of the powers by the writ Court - Award of punishment of dismissal or removal from service is harshest measure of punishment and no less than death penalty for Government servant - It has cascading effects and touches even the family of the employee - Such order of punishment entails forfeiture of all service-linked benefits accrued to Government servant who is then rendered penniless - If such are drastic consequences, writ Court should not be a mute spectator - In appropriate cases, writ Court is required to come out of self-imposed bar and entertain challenge laid to order of punishment. (Para 22)
(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S. 482 - Pre-arrest bail - Petition for - Allegation against co-accused, who was employee of National Bank, that he received amount of Rs.2,50,000/- from complainant and accused persons, after gaining confidence of complainant, who was stated to be an elderly person, cheated him by making false representations regarding their properties and financial transactions - Accused had issued a legal notice bearing her counter-signature and produced certain documents, whereas cheque allegedly issued by her had her thumb impression - These circumstances, along with specific allegations levelled against accused persons, required due consideration - Considering nature of allegations and role attributed to accused persons, necessity of custodial interrogation cannot be ruled out - Grant of pre-arrest bail to accused persons was neither a license for commission of serious offence nor a shield or protection for having committed grave offences - Remedy of pre-arrest bail, being an extraordinary and discretionary relief, cannot be granted to accused persons against whom specific overt acts were attributed - Pre-arrest bail was refused. (Para 16, 17)
(A) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), S.14(1)(d), S.23 - Allotment of flat - Delay in delivery of possession - Refund of amount - Purchaser booked residential apartment and paid part of sale consideration from his own funds, while remaining amount was disbursed by Bank under housing loan - Builder failed to deliver possession within stipulated period, compelling purchaser to terminate agreement and seek refund - In view of Cl.24 of agreement for sale providing for refund with simple interest at 12% p.a., award of interest at higher rate was not justified - Purchaser was entitled to refund of Rs. 1,27,34,726/- paid from his own funds with interest at 12% p.a. from respective dates of payment till realisation. (Para 10, 14, 15, 22, 23, 27, 28, 31, 32, 47, 48)
(B) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S.73 - Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), S.14(1)(d), S.22 - Reimbursement of rent - Claim for - Double compensation - Purchaser, whose residential apartment was not delivered within stipulated period, elected to terminate agreement and seek refund with interest at 12% p.a. - Claim for reimbursement of rent in addition to interest was not sustainable, as it would amount to double compensation for same default. - Enhanced rent claimed for first time in appeal without adequate documentary evidence of tenancy and rent paid was not maintainable - Purchaser, having elected to seek refund, could not claim rent indefinitely thereafter. (Para 33, 39, 40, 41)
(C) Contract Act (9 of 1872), S.64, S.65, S.70, S.72 - Allotment of flat - Refund of amount - Unjust enrichment - Purchaser paid part of consideration from his own funds and remaining amount was disbursed directly to builder by bank under tripartite agreement - Builder failed to deliver possession within stipulated period - Purchaser's entitlement to refund was limited to Rs. 1,27,34,726/- paid from his own funds, with interest at 12% p.a. from respective dates of payment, as refund of outstanding loan amount disbursed by bank would result in unjust enrichment. (Para 22, 23, 27, 28, 31, 32)
(D) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), S.14(1)(d), S.22 - Compensation - Mental agony and harassment - Entitlement - Purchaser paid about 95% of consideration for residential apartment but remained deprived of both apartment and money for over fifteen years owing to failure of builder to deliver possession - Having regard to prolonged uncertainty and deprivation of benefit of escalation in property prices, compensation of Rs. 15,00,000/- awarded towards full and final satisfaction of claims for rent, mental agony, harassment and litigation expenses was proper. (Para 33, 34, 41)
(E) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), S.2(1)(g), S.14(1)(d) - Deficiency in service - Housing loan - Failure to verify progress of construction - Bank disbursed housing loan instalments directly to builder under tripartite agreement despite purchaser's repeated requests for verification of construction progress, and failed to produce inspection reports or other evidence establishing verification before disbursement - Bank's failure to establish that construction progress was verified before release of loan instalments constituted deficiency in service -Compensation of Rs. 2,00,000/- awarded to purchaser was proper. (Para 42,43, 44)
(F) Consumer Protection Act (68 of 1986), S.23 - Recovery of loan amount - Outstanding dues - Claim for - Jurisdiction - Bank sought recovery of outstanding housing loan from purchaser under tripartite agreement - Bank's claim for recovery of amount due could not be adjudicated in consumer proceedings and was left open for determination by High Court on its own merits, with all contentions of bank and purchaser, including purchaser's liability under the loan. (Para 18, 45, 47)
(A) Court-fees Act (7 of 1870), S. 7(iv)(c) - Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 7, R.11 - Rejection of plaint - Valuation of suit and payment of Court-fees - Declaratory suit regarding sale deed - Executant seeking declaration of nullity on grounds of fraud - Obligation to pay ad valorem Court-fee - Plaintiff filed suit for declaration that a registered sale deed was null, void, and ineffective - Plaint pleadings established that plaintiff was himself an executant of the sale deed in question - Declaration was sought on the grounds of fraud, misrepresentation, and non-receipt of sale consideration - Plaintiff paid fixed court-fee, contending that the document was a nullity - Held, where an executant of a document seeks to avoid its binding effect by seeking a declaration that it is null and void on grounds of fraud or misrepresentation, the relief sought, in substance and essence, entails cancellation of the instrument - A mere assertion that a sale deed is a nullity does not entitle an executant-plaintiff to pay a fixed court-fee - Allegations of non-receipt of consideration or fraud do not alter the substantive nature of the relief for the purpose of court-fee determination - Order directing the plaintiff to pay ad valorem court-fee held proper - Rejection of plaint under Order 7, Rule 11 for failure to pay requisite ad valorem court-fee justified. (Para 7,8,9)
(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S. 497, S. 503 - Interim custody of seized vehicle - Rejection of application - Allegation that Police found 62 kgs. 550 gms. of Poppy Straw from possession of accused as he was transporting said contraband in offending vehicle, which was seized by police during investigation - Condition of vehicle was deteriorating day by day - Final conclusion of trial would take sufficient long time - It would be appropriate to release seized vehicle on interim custody to accused who was its registered owner - Order rejecting application was set aside - Vehicle was released. (Para 6, 7)
(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.528 - Quashing of cognizance order - Bigamy - Allegations that accused solemnized second marriage during subsistence of first marriage, which had not been dissolved by decree of divorce - Statement of witness and photographs depicting performance of marriage rituals disclosed prima facie material to constitute alleged offence - Concurrent findings of Trial Court and Revisional Court disclosed no infirmity - Cognizance order not liable to be quashed. (Para 6, 6.1, 7, 8, 9)
(A) Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (33 of 1989), S. 14 - Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.200, S.202, S.460, S.461 - Cognizance of offence - Summoning order - Procedural irregularity - Complaint alleged assault, caste-based abuses and criminal intimidation - Impugned order is not an order passed exercising the special jurisdiction vested in the Special Court under Section 14 of the SC/ST Act - Rather the Magistrate have initially taken cognizance and recorded statements before transfer of complaint to Special Judge under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Special Judge independently considered complaint and preliminary statements and summoned accused for offences punishable under Ss. 323, 504 and 506 IPC and S.3(1)(r) of the Act - Initial procedural irregularity before Magistrate, in absence of prejudice or failure of justice, did not vitiate subsequent proceedings, and complaint and preliminary statements prima facie disclosed grounds for summoning accused - Cognizance taken and summoning order issued by Special Judge were proper. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15)
(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S. 483 - Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act (2 of 2016), S. 12 - Bail to juvenile - Denial to grant - Offence of murder - Child in conflict with law (SP), aged about 17 years was facing allegations of participation in a knife attack that resulted in death of victim - Juvenile Justice Board and Appellate Court, refused bail primarily due to gravity of offence and preliminary observations in Social Investigation Report - S. 12 of the Act mandates release on bail unless specific grounds exist demonstrating that release would lead to association with known criminals, expose child to moral, physical, or psychological danger, or defeat the ends of justice - Finding no criminal antecedents, no concrete material satisfying exceptions u/S. 12 of the Act and noting willingness of mother to take custody on supurdaginama, prolonged detention of SP in an Observation Home would run counter to his best interest, rehabilitation and reformation - Bail was granted upon furnishing a personal bond. (Para 8, 9, 10, 11, 12)
(A) M. P. Accommodation Control Act (41 of 1961), S.11 - Fixation of interim rent - Rejection of application - Ground that rent agreement was quite old and respondents were running their shop on basis of same - Under provisions of Act of 1961, Rent Controlling Authority is bound to fix interim rent - It cannot refuse to do so on any ground, particularly grounds taken in order rejecting application - Even if suit premises were old and had been constructed in year 1955, same cannot be reason to reject application - It was incumbent upon Rent Controlling Authority to have fixed interim rent as per provisions of S.11 of Act - Order rejecting application was not proper. (Para 6,9)
(A) All India Council forTechnical Education (Norms and Guidelines for Fees and Guidelines for Admission in Professional Colleges) Regulations (1994), Regn. 7 - All India Council For Technical Education Act (52 of 1987), S. 10, S. 23 - Revised fee structure - B.Tech and B.Pharm courses - Challenge as to - Appellant College cannot be blamed for implementing revised fee structure after conclusion of first semester, but problem arising out of mid-stream implementation of revised fee schedule could have been avoided, if State Govt. had issued notification before commencement of academic session 2023-2024 - Reasoning given by Division Bench of High Court that implementation of revised fee structure for 2023-27 course would have effect of giving retrospective obligation to notification was not acceptable - Approach adopted by High Court in applying principles of equity and estoppel against appellant College on basis of its admission brochure was unsustainable and to that extent, order of Division Bench of High Court was set aside - Final directions of High Court, with respect to applicability of revised fees under Notification dated 16.10.2023 were affirmed.
(B) All India Council forTechnical Education (Norms and Guidelines for Fees and Guidelines for Admission in Professional Colleges) Regulations (1994), Regn. 7 - All India Council For Technical Education Act (52 of 1987), S. 10, S. 23 - Determination of fees - For professional education - Parameters - Discussed.
(A) Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Appointment - Academic verification - Appellant was a bona fide student at University, admitted against an allotted seat in the B.Tech (Civil Engineering) course - Omission of his name from admission disclosure list cannot be visited with adverse consequences upon appellant, nor can it be a ground for withholding verification of his academic credentials - Green Sheet and Detailed Marks Certificates were issued to appellant - Result of appellant in 7th and 8th semesters on either of the set of figures, reflect as 'pass' - Discrepancy in marks of both semester did not touch upon admission of appellant, his status as a student at University, or fact that he passed the course - Appellant had validly passed all examinations and was duly conferred with degree as per his entitlement - No factual dispute was left as far as appellant having passed the examinations and obtained degree - For limited exercise of verifying the correct set of his marks did not warrant relegating him to a Court of competent jurisdiction - Order of High Court directing appellant to approach competent Court of jurisdiction was set aside - State was directed to provide to appellant corrected marks certificates with result records of 7th and 8th semesters, available with Document Verification Committee to the University - Appellant shall then forward verification report of academic credentials to his employer. (Para 16, 17, 19, 20)
(A) Criminal P. C. (2 of 1974), S.439 - Prevention of Money-Laundering Act (15 of 2003), S. 45, S.19 - Bail - Prayer for - Offences of cheating, bribery and misappropriation of public funds in furtherance of criminal conspiracy - There was five-day delay in forwarding arrest order and supporting material to Adjudicating Authority - Term 'immediate transmission' u/S. 19(2), implies expeditious and simultaneous transfer rather than rigid 24-hour deadline - Compile time for voluminous records running into thousands of pages does not invalidate arrest - However, accused had undergone over 20 months of incarceration for offence carrying maximum seven-year sentence - Trial involved thousands of pages of documents and 98 witnesses, making speedy trial impossible - Criminal procedure must not become a punishment in itself - Bail was granted. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12, 13)
(A) Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (31 of 2016), S.62 - Appeal to Supreme Court - Bar of limitation - NCLAT pronounced judgment on 02.08.2023 - Appellant applied for certified copy after 35 days and filed appeal 41 days after receiving copy - Period of inaction before applying for certified copy could not be excluded while computing limitation - Total delay of 76 days exceeded the statutory limit of 45 days and further condonable period of 15 days - Plea that limitation commenced from date of receipt of certified copy was rejected, as it would render the limitation period indefinite and fluctuating - Appeal was barred by limitation. (Para 15, 16)
(A) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O. 21, R. 58, O. 21, R. 97, O. 21, R. 101 - Execution proceedings - Decree for specific performance of Agreement to Sell - Respondent filed execution petition seeking delivery of physical possession of suit property - Wakf, represented by its Managing Trustee/Appellant filed application resisting execution of decree - Claim petition was rejected - In matter, decisive factor was not claim of DHR or appellant, but identity of property in old and contemporaneous revenue or municipal records - Documents relied on by DHR were sketchy and did not establish title, let alone defeat title in favour of appellant recognised in earlier rounds of litigation with third party and others up to Supreme Court - Burden was wrongly fastened on third party/appellant - Boundaries in sale deed of 1943 and decree schedule were distinct - In suit, identity of property was not issue - Identity of agreement of sale, as reflected in anterior documents and decree schedule, was established by DHR - DHR had no evidence to contrary - Still, on ground that appellant failed to discharge burden, claim petition was rejected - Such procedure is impermissible and illegal - Court observed that impugned judgment did not conform to well established principles of law - Accordingly, impugned judgment was set aside and matter was referred to executing court for disposal afresh in accordance with law. (Para 10.1, 12)
(A) Hindu Law, - Partition of properties - After death of original owner of property, his LRs entered into family settlement delineating their separate shares in ancestral properties left behind him - Thereafter, suit for partition was filed by one of the LRs in which directions were issued directing partition of suit schedule 'B' and 'C' properties and suit schedule 'A' property was held to be covered by family settlement and suit was dismissed in relation thereto - While appeal against same was pending, compromise was arrived at between parties - Thereafter, some property was gifted by defendant which did not belong to him, therefore, plaintiffs filed suit seeking declaration that gift deed was void - However, Court opined that compromise deed had no evidentiary value - While holding so, Court completely ignored compromise by defendant with plaintiffs and proceeded to hold against them - Single judge also failed to correct inferences from past history, in terms of family settlement of 1959 and compromise of 1986, which had seal of approval of High Court - Non-application of mind by Single Judge was patent from observation that 'execution of Gift Deed was never disputed' - Founded on such fundamental errors, judgment and decree of High Court and Trial Court, was set aside. (Para 7, 11, 12, 14)
(A) Constitution of India, Art. 226 - E-tender-cum-auction - Rejection of H1 bids and cancellation of tender - Judicial review - Corporation cancelled fresh auction for sand groups as bidders had quoted lower amounts after surrendering earlier contracts - Rule 16 permitted surrender and re-participation without prescribing minimum bids with reference to earlier contracts - No collusion or procedural defect was found - Earlier bids were not conclusive measure of prevailing market value - In absence of finding that fresh bids were below reasonably obtainable value, cancellation was arbitrary. (Para 81,95, 96, 97, 98,99, 100)
(B) Constitution of India, Art. 226 - E-tender-cum-auction - Cancellation - Challenge against - Corporation had scrutinised technical eligibility, conducted financial auctions and declared appellants as H1 bidders, before cancelling tender process - A remand cannot be ordered to discover new reasons for already scrutinized decision or to allow Authority to reconsider arguments that failed judicial scrutiny - Setting aside cancellation order restores tender process to its stage immediately preceding rejection, requiring appellants to strictly abide by their final annual bids alongside all security deposits and statutory clearances - Supreme Court directed completion of the remaining tender steps in accordance with its original terms. (Para 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108)
(A) Constitution of India, Art. 309 - Bihar Government Servants (Computer Competency for Recruitment and Confirmation) Rules (2011), R. 4(b) - Increments and pension benefits - Entitlement - Employee appointed as Group 'C' employee in 1984 and superannuated on 31.12.2022 - Granted time-bound promotion and first, second and third A.C.P. benefits - During fixation of pension, Accountant General raised objection that employee had neither passed Computer Competency Test nor obtained exemption under the Rules - Department consequently withdrew increments granted from 24.05.2011 and re-fixed pension - Employee challenged such action - Held, an employee has no vested right to continue receiving increments granted contrary to statutory rules, and erroneous pay fixation can be corrected by re-fixing pension, even though recovery of excess payment may be barred on equitable grounds - Pension was re-fixed and order setting aside recovery of excess payment remained undisturbed. (Para 19, 21, 23, 28)
(A) Haj Committee Act (35 of 2002), S.44 - Constitution of India, Art.226 - Haj Committee Rules (2002), R.16 - Termination of services - Legality - Petitioners were engaged purely on seasonal basis to assist with Haj pilgrimage arrangements such as computer work, passport assistance, etc. - Seasonal clerks are distinct from regular Lower Division Clerks (LDCs) under Recruitment Rules, though LDC posts permit direct recruitment from pool of seasonal clerks who have worked for at least four seasons - Contractual or seasonal appointments do not confer any legal right to permanent absorption, regularization, or automatic renewal upon efflux of time - Petitioners alleged they were being replaced by new contractual employees - However, the official affidavit clarified that advertised posts were for New Delhi branch office to handle North Indian pilgrim visa/passport processing, whereas Mumbai office, where petitioners worked was already adequately staffed - Sympathy and sentiment cannot override statutory rules or be ground to grant relief where no underlying legal right is established - No interference, warranted in termination order. (Para 18, 19, 22)
(A) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (46 of 2023), S.348 - Recalling of complainant - Refusal - Accused stated that notice issued by complainant was not received by him and complainant had not sent notice on the correct address of accused and acknowledgement of notice was not submitted but only photocopy of the track report of sending the notice was submitted - Accused stated that he may be permitted to re-cross examine the complainant only on the limited point of sending notice and received the same - One opportunity ought to be granted to accused to re-cross examine the complainant on the limited aspect of statutory legal demand notice - Refusal to recall complainant for re-cross examination was not proper. (Para 5)
(A) Maharashtra Universities Act (35 of 1994), S. 79(4) - Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Order of absorption - Challenge against - Respondent had filed writ petition before High Court challenging his termination from service - High Court had set aside the termination and directed "Joint Director" to include name of respondent in list of surplus lecturers/ teachers for his absorption in any other college - Said direction fastens a direct and continuous financial and administrative liability upon State - 15 years after institution of writ petition, respondent had filed an application seeking impleadment of "Joint Director" - State, necessary party, was not impleaded in writ proceedings - High Court had erred in fastening liability for absorption upon State without its formal impleadment as a necessary party. (Para 7, 8, 9, 12, 13)
(B) Maharashtra Universities Act (35 of 1994), S. 79(4) - Constitution of India, Art. 226 - Absorption - Challenge against - G.R. Dt. 24th March, 1994 and corrigendum Dt. 21st March, 1997, provides that policy for absorption of surplus lecturers/teachers was applicable exclusively to grant-in-aid colleges - College in which respondent, employee was appointed being functioned on a "no grant-in-aid" basis - Employee did not challenge corrigendum - Without any challenge, reference to Universities Act that S. 79(4) provides mandate to absorb surplus lecturers/teachers applies to all "affiliated colleges" without distinguishing between aided and unaided institutions, rendering 1997 G.R. non-est in law cannot aid the employee - Order of High Court directing to include name of employee in list of surplus lecturers/teachers and to absorb him in any other college was set aside - Considering fact that employee was superannuated and he may not be left without any succour at twilight of his life, direction was issued to State to pay a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,00,000/- to employee. (Para 13, 18)
(A) Constitution of India, Art.226 - Tender - Rejection of technical bid - Tender for Engineering Procurement and Construction (EPC) railway project - Bid rejected for non-submission of physical original Bid Security - Bidder had paid bid Security online via e-payment gateway and uploaded digital receipt on e-procurement portal - Clause permitted bid security via Bank Guarantee, Demand Draft, Fixed Deposit, Banker's Cheque, or e-payment - While instruments like Demand Drafts or Bank Guarantees must be physically delivered to establish lien/control, e-payment directly transfers funds into respondent's bank account, giving them full control immediately - Requiring a physical original document for electronic transfer is impossibility - Rigid adherence to letter of document cannot be countenanced, especially when there is clear impossibility in compliance of same - Rejection of bid was set aside and authority was directed to award the contract to bidder - Since bid security amount was refunded following initial rejection, authorities must facilitate e-payment redeposit within stipulated time. (Para 8, 10)
(A) Constitution of India, Art. 142, Art. 133 - Clarification of judgment - Application for - Seeking clarification of common judgment - By common judgment, Union of India Through Its Secretary and Ors. v. SGT Girish Kumar and Ors. (AIROnline 2026 SC 173) ex-servicemen were held entitled to disability pension, including benefit of broad banding w.e.f. 01.01.1996 or 01.01.2006, as the case may be, along with interest at rate of 6 % p.a. - As per settled law, observations made in judgment are not to be read as provisions of a statute, nor are they to be read divorced from context of facts in which they were made - A difference in facts may make a material difference to precedential value of a decision - Considering established legal principles, common judgment passed in civil appeals cannot be construed to mean that on basis of said judgment grant of disability pension with arrears can be claimed in every case - Each claim should be decided on its own merits. (Para 7, 8)
(A) Arbitration and Conciliation Act (26 of 1996), S. 7, S. 11 - Arbitration agreement - Veritable Party - Determination - Admittedly, asset was acquired by partnership firm, in which, appellants and R1 and R2 were partners, along with original partners - Retirement of original partners led to eventual constitution of another partnership by R1 and R2 - Subsequently with retirement of R2, firm continued as proprietorship with R1 , who inducted R3 and R4 and then retired from firm - If deed of retirement of 03.07.1995 was found to be invalid on allegations raised, then necessarily parties revert to partnership of 09.12.1985 - In which event, it would affect rights of R3 and R4, who were inducted by R1, as partners who obtained rights over 'subject asset' by that partnership deed, in which neither appellants nor R1 and R2 were partners - Dispute raised for arbitration revolved around ownership of 'subject asset'; whether it be by virtue of deed of 09.12.1985 or by deed of 04.11.2009 - Therefore respondents were veritable parties to dispute, since it would substantially affect their rights also as per partnership deed of 30.11.2009 which can be valid only if deed of retirement of appellants was valid. (Para 14, 15, 16)
(A) Bihar Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules (2005), R. 17 - Constitution of India, S. 309 - Dismissal from services - Petitioner,Constable was dismissed from service on allegations of illegal removal of liquor from police station malkhana - Departmental inquiry was initiated while petitioner was in judicial custody and concluded within 33 days - Petitioner contended that he was not afforded an effective opportunity to defend himself or participate in the inquiry - Held, departmental inquiry conducted in a hurried manner without providing effective opportunity to defend himself was unsustainable - Order of dismissal quashed. (Para 12, 13)
(A) Civil P. C. (5 of 1908), O.26, R.9 - Application for local investigation of suit property - Refusal of - Suit for partition among co-sharers wherein plaintiff claimed 50% share and sought declaration of exclusive possession over "Ga" schedule property - Suit property had not yet been partitioned among co-sharers - Share of plaintiff or their predecessor in interest was yet to be decided in suit - No fruitful purpose would be served by local investigation of suit properties - Refusal of application was proper. (Para 7)